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DEVIATIONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW:
AN HISTORICAL FOOTNOTE
ARTHUR T. DOWNEY*
IN John F. Murphy's acclaimed 2004 book, The United States and the Rule
of Law in International Affairs,' he notes that the United States has en-
gaged in "deviations" from the rule of law, and that some scholars cite
treaties-such as the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Treaty, or
the Law of the Sea Convention-that the United States rejected despite
overwhelming support from most other countries, including close U.S. al-
lies. This is a serious charge leveled at America. But then, Professor Mur-
phy quite correctly reminded his readers that such a charge is not well-
founded-a position that took courage, since it was not politically correct.
His reminder was clear:
In the voluntarist system that characterizes the international legal
process, each state is entitled to decide whether becoming . .. a
party to a particular treaty is in its national interest. Its failure to
do so ... is not inconsistent with the rule of law in international
affairs. Indeed, if there are compelling reasons for a state not to
become a party to a treaty, its refusal to sign the treaty supports
the rule of law.
With that as background, and in the context of the sesquicentennial of the
beginning of the American Civil War, this paper reviews a bit of relevant
American diplomatic and legal history from the mid-nineteenth century.
In the mid-1850s, the United States declined to enter into a multilat-
eral convention dealing with maritime matters during wartime, specifically
because the convention included a prohibition on the practice of priva-
teering (the grant of "Letters of Marque and Reprisal"), the preservation
of which was considered to be in America's best interests. According to
some, as Professor Murphy noted, that United States position could be
classed-incorrectly-as a "deviation" from the international rule of law.
Only several years later, however, during the first year of the Civil War, this
United States position put the Union in an awkward position, as the Con-
federate States of America began to commission privateers-or "pirates,"
as the Lincoln Administration termed them. This awkwardness demon-
strates that the assessment of what is in the "compelling national interest"
can change rather quickly and in entirely unforeseen ways.
* Portions of this paper appear in Chapter 6 ("The War at Sea: International
Law and Diplomacy") of ARTHUR T. DowNEY, CIVIL WAR LAwYERs: CONSTITUTIONAL
QUESTIONS, COURTROOM DRAMAS AND THE MEN BEHIND THEM (2010).
1. SeeJOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAw IN INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS 349 (2004).
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I. WHAT ARE PRIVATEERS?
A Letter of Marque and Reprisal was an official warrant or commis-
sion from a government authorizing the designated agent to seize or de-
stroy specified assets belonging to another party that had committed some
offense under the "law of nations," the older term for "international law."
A Letter of Marque usually was used by a government to authorize pri-
vateers to raid and capture merchant shipping of an enemy nation. Ab-
sent such specific state authorization, the- individuals involved in raiding
and capture would be understood to be pirates. 2 A Letter of Marque,
meaning "frontier" in French, authorized the agent to pass beyond the
borders of the nation. It was considered a retaliatory measure short of a
full declaration of war. It was part of maritime economic warfare, and it
was a sort of "guerilla warfare at sea."3 Public navies were expensive and
they had to be maintained in peacetime as well as in wartime, and so gov-
ernments relied heavily on private initiative and enterprise to fight their
wars. The system worked because it was backed by a substantial array of
laws, including prize courts and bond requirements.
To the modern eye, the idea of "privatizing" maritime warfare-com-
missioning private persons whose investors and crew looked to gain profits
from prizes-might seem strange, even leaving aside the fact that the
United States seems to have almost as many private "security" contractors
in Iraq and Afghanistan today as it has soldiers. Two centuries ago, how-
ever, the fundamental notion of relying on private entities to engage in
sovereign-like activities was more the norm. Consider the Dutch East In-
dia Company, established in the early seventeenth century, to carry out
colonial activities in Asia (chiefly in Indonesia) and possessing quasi-gov-
ernmental powers including authority to wage war, negotiate treaties, coin
money, etc. The Dutch West India Company, chartered shortly after, was
granted control of an area from West Africa to the Caribbean. Perhaps
the most prominent of such entities was the British East India Company,
which ruled India from 1757 until 1858, exercising military power and
governmental administration. The Crown took over the governing func-
tions in India after the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, and the Company lost its
quasi-governmental functions.
A. A History of Privateering
The first Letter of Marque issued in England dates from the late thir-
teenth century, but only after 1585 did the letters make provisions for
prizes to be condemned and confiscated by an Admiralty Court with a
2. Whether piracy is a crime against international law seeking only a court
with jurisdiction to apply that law (the "naturalist" position) or whether piracy is
solely a municipal law crime (the "positivist" position) is discussed in Professor
Murphy's latest book. SeeJoHN F. MURPHY, THE EVOLVING DIMENSIONS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw: HARD CHOICES FOR THE WORLD COMMUNITY 76 (2010).
3. CRAIc L. SYMoNDs, THE CIVIL WAR AT SEA 61 (2009).
[Vol. 56: p. 455456
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subsequent division of the goods made between the Crown and the priva-
teer. Privateers had a romanticized4 history: In the late 1580s, the British
Crown issued a Letter of Marque to Sir Francis Drake (1588) and to Sir
Walter Raleigh whose main source of income came from privateering.
More than a century later, Edward Teach was a British privateer during
Queen Anne's War (1702-1713), but he turned to buccaneering (piracy)
after the war, and was then known as the infamous Blackbeard the Pirate.5
During the American Revolution, the American colonials were up
against the great sea power of the British Navy. In November 1775, Massa-
chusetts legislated an Act Authorizing Privateers and Creating Courts of
Admiralty, which permitted the arming of private vessels to attack and to
take into any port in the colony any vessels employed by the enemy.6 The
Continental Congress issued about 800 Letters of Marque, legalizing and
commissioning private enterprises to outfit and send out armed merchant
ships as commerce raiders. One of the first commissions was signed on
October 24, 1776, by John Hancock, as President of the Continental Con-
gress. 7 These ships were given the legal authority to prey on British ship-
ping. In Boston alone, some 365 vessels were commissioned as privateers
during the Revolutionary War. In contrast, the Continental Navy had only
about one hundred ships of war. As one scholar put it:
[The Continental Army] won by not losing; or, in the manner of
modern guerilla insurrections, by making the cost of victory too
high to seem worth it to a complacent, superior foe. Privateers,
on the other hand, carried the war to Britain. Many were plain
bandits; some were genuine patriots.8
After the Revolutionary War, the concept of granting Letters of Mar-
que was expressly recognized in the United States Constitution: Article I,
Section 8 gives Congress the power " [t]o declare War [and] grant Letters
of Marque and Reprisal,"9 and Article I, Section 10 prohibits any state
from granting Letters of Marque and Reprisal.
4. Rhett Butler, in GONE WITH THE WIND, was a Confederate privateer. See
MARGARET MITCHELL, CONE WITH THE WIND (1936).
5. The English tradition in the early nineteenth century was captured bril-
liantly in PATRICK O'BRIAN, THE LETTER OF MARQUE (1988).
6. See ROBERT H. PATTON, PATRIOT PIRATEs: THE PRIVATEER WAR FOR FREEDOM
AND FORTUNE IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27 (2008).
7. Shortly after the outbreak of the revolution in April 1775, the Provincial
Congress-the forerunner of the Continental Congress-authorized the Colonies
to grant Letters of Marque to private ships.
8. PATTON, supra note 6, at xviii-xix.
9. Letters of Marque were also mentioned in the Articles of Confederation-
specifically, in Article VI: "nor shall any State grant ... letters of marque or repri-
sal, except it be after a declaration of war by the United States in Congress assem-
bled,.. . unless such State be infested by pirates." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION Of
1781, art. VI, para. 5. Article IX also vested in Congress assembled the sole and
exclusive right "of granting letters of marquee and reprisal in times of peace . . . ."
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 1. Nevertheless, Article IX fur-
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The apogee' 0 of the issuance by the United States of Letters of Mar-
que occurred during the War of 1812 in the context of the weak United
States Navy against the mighty British sea power-David against Goliath".
Congress declared war on Britain on June 18, 1812, and specifically au-
thorized the President "to issue to private armed vessels of the United
States commissions of marque and general reprisal, in such form as he
shall think proper ... against the vessels, goods, and effects of the Govern-
ment of the [ ] United Kingdom .. . and the subjects thereof."1 2 On June
26, 1812, Congress passed An Act Concerning Letters of Marque, Prizes
and Prize Goods to regulate the privateers. The United States commis-
sioned 526 vessels as privateers, though only about half that number actu-
ally went to sea.' 3 The United States Navy's ships were captured or bottled
up in port after 1813, and so it was left to the privateers to encourage
Britain to terminate the War, since British ship owners and insurance com-
panies suffered heavy losses after American privateers began operating in
British waters.
After the War of 1812, particularly after 1814, when King Ferdinand
VII was restored to the Spanish throne, Spain tried to stop the revolution-
aries in its South American colonies from pressing their independence.
Those South American revolutionaries found support in United States sea-
ports, especially in New Orleans and Baltimore. Agents from "indepen-
dent" South American countries would arrive and distribute commissions
to privateers: from Cartagena (now Colombia), Buenos Aries (Argentina),
or the Oriental Republic (Uruguay). Many of the United States sailors
were veterans of privateering for the United States against Britain, and
looked to South American privateering as a quick way to repair their fi-
nances, as well as to support the cause of independence. The United
States neutrality laws of 1794 and 1797, however, made it a crime to en-
gage in hostilities against any nation at peace with the United States.
ther provides that "Congress assembled shall never ... grant letters of marque or
reprisal in time of peace ... unless nine States assent to the same . . . ." ARTICLES
OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 6.
10. As military technology developed, substitution between private and mili-
tary use became more difficult, and navies became more economic and easier to
monitor-and so privateering declined.
11. For a discussion of the laws of war and of prizes and United States pri-
vateers during the War of 1812, see Frederick C. Leiner, A Ruse de Guerre Gone
Wrong: The Sinking of the Eleanor, 101 MD. HIsT. MAG. 167 (2006). The situation
discussed in the article ended in a unanimous Supreme Court decision in 1817.
See The Eleanor, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 345, 358 (1817) (finding that "no one act is
proven in the case which did not comport with the fair, honorable, and reasonable
exercise of the rights of war"). Francis Scott Key was one of the lawyers who ar-
gued the case.
12. An Act Declaring War Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland and the Dependencies Thereof, and the United States of America and
Their Territories, ch. CII, 2 Stat. 755, 755 (1812).
13. A Baltimore schooner, the Mammoth, commissioned on March 7, 1814,
was one of the most successful privateers, taking twenty-four prizes. Two of her
journals are in the library of the Maryland Historical Society.
458 [Vol. 56: p. 455
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Moreover, in the United States-Spanish Treaty of 1795, the United States
agreed to treat as pirates anyone who violated American neutrality to at-
tack Spain. 1 4 Enforcement was not very effective, even after Congress re-
vised the Neutrality Act.1 5
In late 1835, the Texas Revolutionary Assembly considered how to
protect the Texas coast. Since it was not possible to create overnight a
Republic of Texas Navy, the Texans issued Letters of Marque to protect
the coast, harass Mexican shipping, and bring in prizes-part of whose
proceeds would go to the Texas public treasury.16 During the United
States-Mexican War (1846-1848), the United States did not issue any Let-
ters of Marque; Mexico did, but the result was ineffective.
The potential use of Letters of Marque and Reprisal arose in this
twenty-first century in a somewhat different context: Congressman Ron
Paul, who ran for President in 2008 and has formally announced his candi-
dacy for the 2012 election, introduced a bill (HR 3076) on October 10,
2001, entitled the September 11 Marque and Reprisal Act of 2001. It au-
thorized the President
to commission, under officially issued letters of marque and re-
prisal, so many of privately armed and equipped persons and en-
tities as, in his judgment, the service may require .. . to employ
all means reasonably necessary to seize outside the geographic
boundaries of the United States . . . the person and property of
Osama bin Laden [and] of any al Qaeda co-conspirator .. . re-
sponsible for the air piratical aggressions . . . perpetrated upon
the United States ....
14. The treaty, known as the Treaty of San Lorenzo, which came into force in
August 1796, settled the United States boundaries, but also provided in Article
XIV:
Nor shall any citizen, subject, or Inhabitant of the said United States ap-
ply for or take any commissions or letters of marque for arming any ship
or ships to act as privateers against the subjects of his Catholic Majesty, or
the property of any of them from any prince or state with which the said
king shall be at war. And if any person of either nation shall take such
commissions or letters of marque he shall be punished as a pirate.
Treaty of Friendship, Limits and Navigation, U.S.-Spain, art. XIV, 1 2, Oct. 27,
1795, 8 Stat. 138, 146 [hereinafter Treaty of San Lorenzo].
15. The progression of the Neutrality Act is: Act of March 3, 1817, 3 Stat. 370;
Act of April 20, 1818, 3 Stat. 447; Act of May 15, 1820, 3 Stat. 600. "Between 1816
and 1820, government agents in Massachusetts, Virginia, Maryland, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, and Georgia arrested at least 129 men on charges of piracy
for commandeering vessels and attacking neutrals .... [T]he courts found thirty-
one guilty of piracy [and] seven were executed." See David Head, Baltimore Seafar-
ers, Privateering, and the South American Revolutions, 1816-1820, 103 MD. HIsT. MAG.
269, 282 (2008).
16. Texas issued a total of six letters to privateers. Overall, the privateering
effort was disappointing, since Mexican shipping was not a rich trade, and so rela-
tively few privateers were willing to take the risk.
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The bill also provided for the posting of a security bond before a Letter of
Marque could be issued. The bill did not survive the Committee on Inter-
national Relations. On July 27, 2007, Paul introduced HR 3216, the Mar-
que and Reprisal Act of 2007, which was essentially the same as the 2001
bill, and it suffered the same fate. In April 2009, Paul suggested the use of
Letters of Marque and Reprisal as a solution to the problem of Somali
pirates.
A professor at the United States Naval Academy has suggested that
the United States might today issue Letters of Marque against non-state
actors like terrorist organizations, drug cartels, or even those engaging in
illegal fishing. He suggested a more modern term: "contracts of
marque."17
II. UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO CODIFY INTERNATIONAL LAw
OF MARITIME WARFARE
From its beginning, the United States strongly favored the principles
of freedom of the seas. The United States had international commercial
interests, but no longer had the protection of the British Royal Navy. In
September 1776, the Continental Congress adopted the first American of-
ficial position on maritime rights during wartime. Known as the Treaty
Plan of 1776, it set out four principles:
1. Citizens of a neutral could trade with the enemies of a bellig-
erent (except in contraband);
2. Citizens of a neutral could trade with the enemies of a bellig-
erent (except for contraband) not only from enemy ports to neu-
tral ports, but also between ports of an enemy;
3. Enemy contraband found on neutral ships could not be con-
fiscated by the belligerent ("free ships make free goods"); and
4. Neutral goods (including contraband) found on enemy ves-
sels could be confiscated.
The Founders assumed that, in wartime, the country would have to
depend on neutral vessels to handle American commerce, since the Amer-
ican Navy would never be large enough to take on that task. Therefore,
these principles were very much in the United States' interests. They were
contained in the first American treaty, the 1778 Franco-American Treaty
of Amity and Commerce, although the French later ignored them. Britain
refused to be bound by these liberal maritime principles.
The Anglo-French wars early in the nineteenth century put special
focus on the rights of neutrals and belligerents, since the Americans were
17. Lieutenant Claude Berube, Contracts of Marque, 133 PROCEEDINGS MAG.,
Nov. 2007, at 10 (suggesting modern term for employing private naval
companies).
460 [Vol. 56: p. 455
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the chief neutral suppliers to both belligerents, and each of the belliger-
ents wanted to prevent neutrals from trading with its enemy. And then
there was the War of 1812, which, in part, related to freedom of the seas,
and during which the United States, as a belligerent, paid strict attention
to the rights of neutrals. Over the next several decades, the United States
entered into treaties with many Latin American republics and with Prussia
incorporating the liberal 1776 maritime principles; the United States was
unsuccessful in getting the United Kingdom to so commit.
A. Franklin Pierce and William Marcy
The presidential election of 1852 was interesting in several respects.
This was the last gasp for the Whig Party whose candidate, General Win-
field Scott, suffered an electoral defeat of 254 to 42. Selecting the Demo-
cratic Party candidate was not easy. At the Baltimore convention in June,
there were four major contenders: Stephen A. Douglas, William L. Marcy,
James Buchanan, and Lewis Cass.18 The four deadlocked. But then on
the forty-ninth ballot, a relatively obscure former Senator from New
Hampshire, Franklin Pierce, leapt ahead of the four favorites to win the
nomination, and then the Presidency. Pierce took office March 4, 1853.
In a move not unlike the "team of rivals"19 that Lincoln assembled,
Pierce selected Marcy to lead his Cabinet as Secretary of State. (Pierce
sent Buchanan to London as the United States Minister to the Court of St.
James.) Marcy had been an Associate Justice of the New York Supreme
Court, Governor of New York for three terms, and Secretary of War under
President Polk. In foreign policy, Pierce and Marcy displayed traditional
Democratic assertiveness: interest in detaching Cuba from Spain, opening
Japan to United States trade, and narrowing the UK role in Central
America. The first quarter of Pierce's First Annual Message to Congress
on December 5, 1853, dealt with foreign affairs. Just four months later,
Europe was immersed in the Crimean War.
B. The Crimean War
France and Britain declared war on Russia on March 28, 1854. The
war pitted France, Britain, and the Ottoman Empire (along with the King-
dom of Sardinia and the Duchy of Nassau) against the Russian Empire.2 0
The United States declared its neutrality. Both France and Britain an-
nounced at the beginning of the Crimean War that they would follow the
18. Four years later, Buchanan became the Democratic nominee, and then
President; Cass served as Buchanan's Secretary of State. Jefferson Davis was his
Secretary of War. Pierce's Cabinet remained unchanged for all four years, the only
time in United States history when this stability obtained.
19. Dolus KERNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIvALs: THE PoLITIcAL GENIUS OF ABRA-
HAM LINcoLN (2005).
20. The population of Russia at that time (74 million) was greater than the
combined populations of France and Britain; Russia's losses were almost three
times the combined losses of France and Britain.
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principle that "free ships make free goods," but that it would be observed
only during the conflict.2'
Pierce and Marcy decided that this French/British position gave the
United States an opportunity to try to make that doctrine a principle of
international law by enshrining it in a multilateral treaty. The American
proposition would embrace the rule of "free ships make free goods, except
for contraband," but would add to it the idea that neutral property (other
than contraband) on enemy ships would be exempt from confiscation.
Secretary of State Marcy instructed all United States diplomatic posts in
Paris, London, St. Petersburg, and elsewhere to propose such a treaty-so
as to lock in these liberal principles as a matter of the law of nations. Rus-
sia acted promptly, and on July 22, 1854, Secretary Marcy negotiated and
signed in Washington with the Russian charge d'affaires a Convention for
the Rights of Neutrals on the Sea.22 After Senate action, it entered into
force on November 1, 1854.23 The convention expressly looked forward
to the accession of other countries. Russia and the United States enjoyed
a good relationship, in large part because each saw the other as an ally
against the potential efforts of Great Britain to partition the Russian Em-
pire and to thwart American expansion. 24
The Kingdom of Prussia expressed interest in a treaty based on the
Marcy instructions. Prussia, however, threw in a monkey wrench: it pro-
posed an additional article renouncing privateering. The President and
the Secretary were unhappy at this prospect. Pierce explained it quite
clearly in his Second Annual Message to Congress of December 4, 1854:
If [abolishing privateering] were adopted as an international
rule, the commerce of a nation having comparatively a small na-
val force would be very much at the mercy of its enemy in case of
war with a power of decided naval superiority. The bare state-
ment of the condition in which the United States would be
21. The Anglo-French modus vivendi also provided that neither would issue
Letters of Marque.
22. The convention laid out two principles: (1) free ships make free goods,
i.e., goods of a belligerent (except contraband) are free from confiscation on neu-
tral vessels; and (2) property of neutrals on board a belligerent vessel (except con-
traband) are not subject to confiscation. See Convention Relative to the Rights of
Neutrals at Sea, U.S.-Russ.,July 22, 1854, 10 Stat. 1105 (recognizing "indispensable
conditions of all freedom of navigation and maritime trade").
23. See United States Treaty with Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1854, at 1.
24. In April 1861, the U.S. Minister to Russia reported to Washington on his
meeting with the Foreign Minister, Prince Gortchacow, relating to not recognizing
the newly formed Confederate States of America. The Prince explained that the
Emperor strongly supported the Union position in part because it "was the only
commercial counterpoise in the world ... to Great Britain, and Russia would do
nothing, therefore, to diminish its just power and influence." Dispatch from John
Appleton, U.S. Minister at St. Petersburg, to Secretary of State Seward (April 8-20,
1861), in PAPERS RELATING TO FOREIGN AFFAIRs ACCOMPANYING THE ANNUAL MES-
SAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE SECOND SESSION THIRTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS 299
(Kraus Reprint Corp. 1965) (1861).
462 [ol. 56: p. 455
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placed, after having surrendered the right to resort to privateers,
in the event of war with a belligerent of naval supremacy will
show that this Government could never listen to such a proposition.
(emphasis added)
Just in case anyone missed his point, Pierce went on to explain that the
British Navy25 was at least ten times as large as the United States Navy,
even though the commerce of the two nations was about the same size.
Therefore, without resort to privateers-Pierce used the term "our mer-
cantile marine"-the British could inflict injury on United States com-
merce tenfold greater than that which the United States could retaliate.
Pierce said that to give up the right to privateers would be the equivalent
of giving up the right to enlist volunteers for the Army: when the United
States has to engage in war, "it confidently calls upon the patriotism of its
citizens ... to augment the Army and the Navy so as to make them fully
adequate for the emergency."
By December of 1855, President Pierce was able to announce that
Nicaragua and the Kingdom of Hawaii had acceded to the declaration of
neutral maritime principles contained in the United States-Russia conven-
tion of the year before.2 6 As to neutral rights and obligations, the central
issue at that time was the attempts by the United Kingdom to draw recruits
from the United States for service in the war against Russia. Pierce vigor-
ously asserted that United States law prevented United States citizens from
enlisting in the service of any foreign state, including as a sailor "on board
any vessel or war, letter of marque or privateer."
C. The Congress of Paris
This "congress" was a peace conference held in Paris among France,
Britain, the Ottoman Empire, Sardinia, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Rus-
sia yielded to peace negotiation after Austria, on February 1, 1856,
threatened to enter the Crimean war on the side of the Allies, and after
the 1855 death of Nicholas I and his replacement by Alexander II. The
negotiations resulted in the Treaty of Paris, signed on March 30, 1856,
which formally ended the war, maintained the integrity of the Ottoman
Empire, and neutralized the Black Sea.27
25. Pierce did not refer to Great Britain by name, but used the term "the navy
of the first maritime power in Europe." See President Franklin Pierce, Second An-
nual Message to Congress (Dec. 4, 1854), available at http://millercenter.org/
scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3729.
26. See President Franklin Pierce, Third Annual Message to Congress (Dec.
31, 1855), available at http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/
3730.
27. Russia repudiated these Black Sea provisions in 1870.
463
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D. The Declaration of Paris
The delegations that had worked out the peace arrangements ending
the Crimean War remained in Paris and they drew up the Declaration of
Paris which was signed on April 16, 1856, by Britain, France, Austria, Rus-
sia, Prussia, Sardinia, and the Ottoman Empire. It was the first multilat-
eral effort to codify in time of peace rules which were applicable in time of
war. The United States was not present during the negotiations.
The preamble of the Declaration noted that maritime law in time of
war had long been the subject of "deplorable disputes," and the "uncer-
tainty of the law and of the duties ... gives rise to differences of opinion
between neutrals and belligerents." Accordingly, the Declaration con-
tained four principles, which included:
2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of
contraband of war;
3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are
not liable to capture under enemy's flag; and
4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective-that is
to say, maintained by a force sufficient to prevent access to the
coast of the enemy.
These provisions were gratifying to the United States, because they
embody the liberal principles for which the United States had for so long
campaigned; and, principles 2 and 3 were the exact principles that the
United States had suggested two years earlier. The fourth principle was
unobjectionable.
But, the first principle was a stumbling block. It provided-with de-
ceptive simplicity-that: "Privateering is and remains abolished." It re-
flected a view by the parties that private armed ships too often ventured far
from home and beyond the reach of the regular naval forces, and so it was
too hard to keep them under control. Of course, the parties-particularly
the French and British-had large naval forces and so their need for pri-
vateers was not great, and the existence of privateers of other countries
needlessly put Anglo-French commercial interests at risk. The Declaration
obligated parties to the treaty not to issue Letters of Marque commission-
ing privateers; but, it did not obligate them to treat privateers commis-
sioned by non-party nations as outlaws (international criminals).
E. The United States Reaction
The four principles in the Declaration were viewed by the parties as
indivisible, and so the United States could not accede to the Declaration's
three other principles without also accepting the difficult first principle
abolishing privateering. While noting that the right of privateering was
"of essential importance" to countries such as the United States without
large public navies, Secretary Marcy also took the generous position that
[Vol. 56: p. 455464
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the parties to the Paris Declaration presumably were really only aiming to
protect private property: that private property on the ocean, though it
might belong to citizens of a belligerent state, should be exempt from
capture. Marcy then proposed an amendment to the first principle that
outlawed privateering by adding the clause: "and that the private property
of subjects and citizens of a belligerent on the high seas shall be exempt
from seizure by the public armed vessels of the other belligerent, except
be it contraband." If so amended, the United States could accede to the
Declaration of Paris,28 because its fundamental goal of protecting private
commercial property would be safeguarded. Marcy sent this proposal to
American diplomatic posts, and presented it in a note to the French lega-
tion in Washington.
Not surprisingly, the Emperor of Russia approved the United States
position and undertook to try to get the other parties to the Declaration of
Paris to agree. But, the consultation among the parties took time. And
the United States was out of time to devote to foreign affairs. Domestic
issues dominated: the slavery issue had broken out in violence, Kansas was
"bleeding," political sectionalism was robust, and threats of secession grew
louder. In complete contrast to his previous three Annual Messages to
Congress, President Pierce devoted the entire first half of his Fourth (and
final) Message to those painful domestic issues. The presidential candi-
date of the newly formed Republican Party lost the election in the fall of
1856, and Democrat James Buchanan, Pierce's Minister in London for
four years, took the Presidential oath of office in March 1857. The new
Secretary of State, Lewis Cass, instructed American diplomats to suspend
discussions on the American maritime proposal until the President had
time to study the issues.2 9 But, of course, domestic issues increasingly took
Buchanan's attention and the discussions remained suspended
indefinitely.3 0
In short, the United States did not accede to the 1856 Declaration of
Paris, and so the abolition of privateering was not an obligation of the
United States.31 In the eyes of some critics of America, as Professor Mur-
28. President Pierce explained all of this in his Fourth [and last] Annual Mes-
sage to Congress on December 2, 1856. See President Franklin Pierce, Fourth An-
nual Message (Dec. 2, 1856), available at http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/
speeches/detail/3731.
29. Former Secretary of State Marcy died a few months later.
30. Buchanan and Pierce are usually ranked among the least effective presi-
dents in United States history.
31. During the United States-Spanish War, both countries agreed to abide by
the principles of the 1856 Paris Declaration; President McKinley issued such a
proclamation on April 21, 1898. As a consequence of merchant vessels being used
in combatant fleets during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-especially the Russian
merchant fleet moving through the Bosporus and Dardanelles-the Second
Hague Conference of 1907 produced a Convention VII Relating to the Conversion
of Merchant-Ships into War-Ships, which dealt with the problem, for example, by
requiring that merchant ships transformed into combatants bear the distinctive
signs of their war service. That reflected a more gentlemanly era of naval warfare.
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phy noted, the United States position-refusing to join a treaty widely sup-
ported by allies-might be termed a "deviation" from the international
rule of law. The rationale put forward by President Pierce and Secretary
Marcy, however, suggests that the United States refusal to accede was a
wise exercise of sovereign rights in the compelling interests of the United
States; their refusal was actually in support of the rule of law.
III. HisTORY's IRONY: CIVIL WAR PRIVATEERS-OR, WERE THEY PIRATES?
Almost exactly four years after President Buchanan entered the White
House, the situation in the United States was quite different. On April 15,
1861, following the fall of Fort Sumter, President Lincoln formally an-
nounced the existence of an "insurrection" and called for volunteers to
deal with the problem. From the South's perspective, this looked like a
call for an invasion by the North. In response, Jefferson Davis, President
of the Confederate States of America (CSA), on April 17, issued a procla-
mation calling for volunteers to defend the new nation. He then invited
"all those who may desire, by service in private armed vessels . . . , to aid
this government" by applying for Letters of Marque and Reprisal. The
private armed vessels were to capture and harass Northern merchant ships
at sea. Because the CSA had no navy, this proposition made great sense:
the privateers could challenge the Union immediately, while real CSA
Navy vessels were being bought or built.
The CSA Constitution provided that Congress had the power to
"grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures
on land and water."3 2 On May 6, 1861, the CSA Congress passed the ap-
propriate legislation,33 after which Davis began to issue letters commis-
sioning privateers. He was careful to follow the law exactly, knowing
that-to gain international recognition-the CSA had to be seen to be
acting in accordance with law. The law established administrative proce-
dures for the issuance of letters, requiring, for example, a bond, a list of
investors, and the names of the captain and crew. Davis's instructions to
the newly commissioned privateers were to proceed "with all justice and
humanity" toward Union vessels. A privateer which captured a prize vessel
had to bring the prize into a properly constituted court for adjudication,
and the privateer had to prove that the enemy owned the vessel. If the
prize was found lawful, the vessel was sold at a court-ordered auction. Af-
ter taxes, the proceeds were to be divided among the crew and investors.
Under traditional international law, a properly commissioned privateer
enjoyed the protection of the laws of war, and so, if captured, the crew was
entitled to honorable treatment as prisoners of war.
32. CONST. OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AM. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (1861).
33. See Act of May 6, 1861, 13 Stat. 70 ("An Act Recognizing the existence of
war between the United States and the Confederate States, and conceming Letters
of Marque, prizes and prize goods.")
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The first vessel to receive a CSA Letter of Marque was the privateer
the Savannah, on May 18, 1861.
A. Lincoln's Response
Two days afterJefferson Davis's April 17 Proclamation, Lincoln issued
another Proclamation announcing a blockade, but also directly addressing
the CSA threat of privateers. Lincoln explained that insurrectionists had
threatened to issue "pretend" Letters of Marque, and therefore: "if any
person, under the pretended authority of said States, . . . shall molest a
vessel of the United States ... ,such person will be held amendable to the
laws of the United States for the prevention and punishment of piracy."
Thus, Lincoln made it plain that those in the South who wanted to take
the risks of entering into privateering, now also had to weigh the fact that
the Union would treat them as pirates.3"
Queen Victoria, on May 13, 1861, issued a Proclamation of Neutrality
on the "hostilities [which] have unhappily commenced between the Gov-
ernment of the United States and certain States styling themselves as the
Confederate States of America." Two weeks later, in accordance with the
obligations of a neutral, Britain announced that it would forbid the armed
ships, "and also the privateers, of both parties from carrying prizes made
by them into the ports . . . of the United Kingdom, or any of Her Majesty's
Colonies or possessions abroad."" In quick succession, France, Belgium,
Holland, Spain, Portugal, and other European powers issued similar posi-
tions of neutrality. These actions made Confederate privateering more
difficult, because prizes could no longer be brought into British or Span-
ish ports in the Caribbean; their only welcoming ports would be in the
CSA itself, and that required running the treacherous Union blockade.
The number of privateers being commissioned began to dwindle.
On the other hand, the British were outraged at Lincoln's announce-
ment that the Union would treat properly commissioned CSA privateers as
pirates. The Lord Chancellor opined that if the United States put to
death a privateer with a proper Letter of Marque, the United States would
be guilty of murder. Needless to say, the British reaction complicated the
position of the Lincoln Administration.
In July 1861, Union naval forces captured crews from two CSA pri-
vateers-the Savannah and the Jefferson Davis-and they were imprisoned
in New York and Philadelphia, respectively, to be tried for piracy. Shortly
thereafter, Jefferson Davis wrote to Lincoln and proposed to exchange the
crews of the privateers for an equal number of Union soldiers being held
34. On May 22, before the news of the Queen's Neutrality Proclamation
reached Washington, Seward instructed the United States Minister in London,
Charles Francis Adams (the son and grandson of American Presidents) to tell the
British with respect to the proposed Union treatment of privateers "that this is a
question exclusively our own. We treat them as pirates."
35. 3 June, 1861 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) (1861) 471 (announcing dispatch
of June 1, 1861, followed by additional instructions on June 2).
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as prisoners of war by the Confederacy. To underscore the point, Davis
explained that if the privateers were hanged ("a barbarous act"), then Da-
vis would order that an equal number of Union prisoners would be
hanged in retaliation. Lincoln, of course, did not reply in order to avoid
any hint of recognition of the Confederacy. The privateers were tried in
October: in Philadelphia the crew from the Jefferson Davis was convicted of
piracy, but in New York the crew from the Savannah was not convicted due
to a hung jury. The CSA Secretary of War, Judah P. Benjamin ordered
that Union prisoners from the battle of Bull Run be removed from pris-
oner of war camps and put into jails pending execution if the CSA pri-
vateers were hanged.
The uncomfortable, but very clear, message was received in Washing-
ton. Congress adopted a Joint Resolution 3 6 requesting the President to
create a system for the exchange of prisoners. Within several months, the
privateers from New York and Philadelphia were released in a general ex-
change, and they were greeted with acclaim in Charleston. No more CSA
privateers were tried for piracy.
B. Back to the Declaration of Paris: Renewed American Diplomacy
Following the dueling Proclamations of Davis and of Lincoln in mid-
April 1861 relating to privateering, Secretary of State William Seward-
who, twenty years earlier, ironically, had succeeded former Secretary Wil-
liam Marcy as Governor of New York-decided that American diplomacy
should get to work to ensure that the United States could accede to the
1856 Declaration of Paris, specifically including its first principle by which
privateering would be abolished.
Accordingly, on April 24, 1861, Seward sent a lengthy circular instruc-
tion to the American Ministers in Great Britain, France, Russia, Prussia,
Austria, Belgium, Italy, and Denmark.3 7 He reviewed the original 1854
Pierce/Marcy proposal for the adoption of two principles, and the conclu-
sion of the 1856 Declaration of Paris. He faithfully explained the reasons
for the rejection by Pierce/Marcy of the first principle abolishing priva-
teering, the counter-proposal by them for a broad private property amend-
ment to the first principle, and the suspension of further consideration
when the Buchanan Administration came into office in March 1857 and
was consumed by domestic issues.
Seward then instructed the Ministers to find out whether their host
governments would be willing to negotiate the United States accession to
the Declaration of Paris. Seward added-for the information of the Minis-
ters only-that President Lincoln supported the amendment proposed by
36. See H.R.J. Res. 37th Cong. (1861) (enacted). The Dix-Hill Cartel of July
22, 1862 was the first formal agreement between the two sides. Exchanges termi-
nated a year later.
37. Secretary Seward's circular instruction was included among the Papers
Relating to Foreign Affairs Accompanying the President's Message to Congress at
the Opening of Its Session in December 1861.
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Secretary Marcy, but acknowledged that "the right season seems to have
passed" for that option. Nevertheless, since the insurrectionists in the
South proclaimed a "resolution to invite privateers to prey upon the
peaceful commerce of the United States," the President was persuaded
that, under these circumstances, "it is wise to secure the lesser good of-
fered by the Paris congress, without waiting indefinitely in the hope to
obtain the greater one [that had been offered by Pierce/Marcy]." In
other words, we want to abolish privateering, even if it means a total rever-
sal of the previous United States position on the 1856 Declaration of Paris.
The diplomacy became complicated by the formal Neutrality Procla-
mation of Britain and others, and also because France and Britain agreed
to act jointly with respect to decisions relating to neutrality in the Ameri-
can Civil War.3 8 By early August, however, the British had agreed in prin-
ciple to the idea of United States accession to the Paris Declaration "pure
and simple." The Foreign Secretary, Lord Russell, however, explained,
"[T] he engagement [of treaty obligations] will be prospective, and will not
invalidate anything already done."39 The British then increased the pres-
sure: the United Kingdom and other parties to the Declaration of Paris
planned to issue, at the time of the United States accession, an accompa-
nying written declaration stating that "Her Majesty does not intend
thereby to undertake any engagement which shall have any bearing, direct
or indirect, on the internal differences now prevailing in the United
States." Charles Francis Adams, the United States Minister in London,
told the British that this proposition was "novel and anomalous." 40 The
American envoy, viewing this step as almost an insult, formally declined to
"fix a day for proceeding in the negotiation." 1
The timing of this tough new British position was significant. It was
presented just after the news finally reached London-in those pre-trans-
Atlantic telegraph days-that the Union had imprisoned the Confederate
privateer crews from the Savannah and the Jefferson Davis and intended to
try them as pirates and hang them when convicted. It was one thing for
Lincoln to state in late April 1861 that he intended to treat as pirates any
"prospective" privateers the CSA might commission, though at that point
no privateers had yet been commissioned; Lincoln's Proclamation might
have been no more than a bluff. But now, in the late summer, the fact of
38. The British-French "understanding" that they would act in concert on
matters of the United States Civil War was not at first communicated directly to the
United States. Rather, the United States learned of it through a report from the
United States legation in St. Petersburg. Message of Secretary of State Seward to
William L. Dayton, United States Minister in Paris (June 17, 1861). There was also
some confusion as to whether the United States-British discussions were to be lo-
cated in Washington (as between Lord Lyons and Secretary Seward) or in London
(as between Minister Charles Francis Adams and Lord Russell).
39. Dispatch from Secretary Seward to Charles Francis Adams, United States
Minister in London (Aug. 17, 1861).
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privateers being treated as pirates was unambiguous and spoke otherwise.
Moreover, the "facts on the ground" were informative: the Union had
badly lost the first major battle of the war in the disaster of Bull Run 42 in
July 1861; what had been generally assumed in the North (and by diplo-
mats)-that the North would crush the rebellion within ninety days-was
clearly now wrong.4 3 The United Kingdom, and therefore France too,
could not be seen to be inserting itself into this very delicate issue which
would be inconsistent with its neutrality-especially if the Confederacy
might win. And it was now far from certain that the Confederacy would be
crushed, so why risk alienating a potential new country? In a formal note
to Minister Adams on August 28, 1861, Lord Russell laid out the British
position with great clarity:
It would certainly follow logically and consistently [in light of
British neutrality] that the so-called Confederate States, being ac-
knowledged as a belligerent, might, by the law of nations, arm
privateers, and that their privateers must be regarded as the
armed vessels of a belligerent.
With equal logic and consistency it would follow, from the
position taken [by Lincoln], that the privateers of the southern
States might be decreed to be pirates, and it might be further
argued by the government of the United States that [Britain, af-
ter signing with the United States a treaty] declaring that priva-
teering was and remains abolished, would be bound to treat the
[CSA] privateers as pirates.44
Lord Russell could foresee that this conflict would surely lead to charges
of "bad faith" between the United States and United Kingdom (and
France, and other signatories) with respect to the treatment accorded to
CSA privateers. The Foreign Secretary explained further that he had orig-
inally planned to make this statement verbally. In the end, however, he
considered it would be "more clear, more open, more fair to Mr. Adams to
put the declaration in writing, and to give notice of it to Mr. Adams before
signing the convention."4 5
In light of the British-French position, Secretary Seward understood
that by acceding to the Declaration of Paris under these conditions, the
Union would gain nothing. By the end of September, Seward had advised
American diplomats of the problematic negotiations. Typical was the mes-
sage from Seward to the United States Minister in Turin in which Seward
42. The battle of Bull Run (as it was known in the North), or Manassas (as it
was known in the South), took place on July 21, 1861.
43. For the impact of Bull Run, see generally JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BArLE
CRY OF FREEDOM ch. 11 (1988).
44. Note from Lord Russell to Charles Francis Adams, United States Minister
in London (Aug. 28, 1861).
45. See id.
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placed the blame elsewhere for the "failure of negotiations with enlight-
ened powers for the advancement of the interests of peace and human-
ity."4 6 Finally, in November, Seward instructed United States diplomats to
"let the matter rest" in light of the British-French position to "which the
United States cannot yield." 47
At year's end, Lincoln began his first Annual Message to Congress by
noting that a "nation which endures factious domestic division is exposed
to disrespect abroad."4 8 The only oblique mention of the failure of
Seward's effort with respect to the Declaration of Paris was to note that "we
have failed to induce some of the commercial powers to adopt a desirable
melioration of the rigor of maritime war."49 However, in that same mes-
sage, Lincoln also signaled that he was not planning to treat privateers as
pirates.5 0
After the Civil War, the Supreme Court offered a perspective on the
questions of whether Confederate vessels were properly treated as pirates.
Just a month after the war began, a Confederate ship seized a private ves-
sel (the Marshall) at the mouth of the Mississippi River and claimed her as
a prize. The owner of the Marshall had the year before taken out an insur-
ance policy to protect against the "adventures and perils of the sea," which
specifically included "pirates" and "assailing thieves." However, expressly
excluded from the insurance coverage was "loss . . . arising from capture."
The owner of the Marshall sued the insurance company to cover his loss.
The question was whether the taking of the ship by the naval forces of the
Confederacy was a "capture"; if it was, the loss was not one of the perils
insured against, and the owner could not recover under the insurance
policy.
The Supreme Court decided during the December Term, 1867, that
this was a capture.5 1 The opinion, written by justice Samuel Nelson, noted
several cases involving capture by privateers.52 Nelson described the core
issue as whether the Confederate government, under whose authority the
taking was made, was a de facto government-not whether it was a lawful
government. Nelson found the Confederacy to have been a government
46. Dispatch from Secretary of State Seward to Minister George P. Marsh
(Sept. 22, 1861).
47. Dispatch from Secretary of State Seward to Minister George P. Marsh
(Nov. 22, 1861).
48. President Abraham Lincoln, First Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3,
1861), available at http://www.infoplease.com/t/hist/state-of-the-union/73.html.
49. See id.
50. See id. Lincoln said that, rather than capturing "pirates," it would be
more effectual" if the United States Navy would focus its efforts on recapturing
the prizes, which they might have taken. Id.
51. See Mauran v. Ins. Co., 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 1 (1867).
52. This included an old English case by Lord Mansfield, the greatest English
jurist of the eighteenth century, involving the capture of a neutral vessel by an
English privateer. Also included was a United States Supreme Court case from
1818 involving privateers commissioned by South American colonies of Spain as
part of their struggle for independence.
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in fact, possessing the supreme power in the territory in which its jurisdic-
tion extended; indeed, the United States government conceded (or acqui-
esced in) the exercise of belligerent rights in "the treatment of captives,
both on land and sea, as prisoners of war, and dealt with them
accordingly."5 3
While this was a relatively narrow insurance policy case, it demon-
strates the difficulties surrounding the Union's effort to avoid legal recog-
nition of the Confederacy, while at the same time treating Confederate
soldiers and sailors-including privateers-as belligerent prisoners of war.
Even more interesting is the array of participants in that case. The
opinion was written by Justice Samuel Nelson,54 who presided over the
1861 New York case of the privateer/pirate crew from the Savannah, which
resulted in a hung jury; he also wrote the blistering dissent in the most
important case decided by the Supreme Court during the Civil War, The
Prize Cases,'5 5 involving the lawfulness of the blockade. The dissent in the
insurance case was written by Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase and Justice
Noah H. Swayne, the last and the first Supreme Court appointees of Presi-
dent Lincoln, respectively. The lawyer for the insurance company-the
winning party-was Benjamin P. Curtis, the formerJustice of the Supreme
Court who had delivered the famous dissent in the Dred Scott case ten years
earlier, after which he resigned from the Court.56 Finally, a brief writer
for the ship owner-the losing side-was Richard Henry Dana who had
argued the winning side in The Prize Cases, and was the author of Two Years
Before the Mast.5 7
IV. IN SUM
This brief review reveals America as an international law activist in
mid-1854. It was then that the United States tried to seize the opportunity
presented by the Crimean War to advance its interests in protecting mari-
time commerce during wartime by expanding and codifying international
law. Unfortunately, this resulted only in minor bilateral successes, perhaps
understandable when the attention of the major European powers was fo-
cused on that bloody war. Not being at the negotiating table in Paris just
after the congress that ended the Crimean War, the United States was at a
disadvantage when the 1856 Declaration of Paris was concluded. The
53. Mauran, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)at 14.
54. Nelson and Secretaries of State Marcy and Seward were all New Yorkers.
55. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (1 Black) 635 (1862).
56. Though a strong Unionist, in late 1862, Curtis attacked the Preliminary
Emancipation Proclamation as being beyond the power of the President. Apart
from appearing as an advocate in more than forty Supreme Court cases, Curtis
served as co-counsel for the defense in the Senate trial of President Andrew
Johnson.
57. For Dana's role in The Prize Cases, see Jeffrey L. Amestov, The Supreme Court
Argument that Saved the Union: Richard Henry Dana, Jr., and The Prize Cases, 35J. of
S. CT. HisT. 10 (2010).
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United States was faced with a treaty agreed to by most of the major mar-
time countries, but which required the abolition of privateering. Because
the United States had only a small navy, accepting such an obligation
would have amounted to a form of unilateral naval disarmament. With
some courage, therefore, including perhaps facing a charge by some that
the United States was "deviating" from the international rule of law, the
United States rejected the treaty. Its rationale was compelling. Neverthe-
less, the United States offered a counter-proposal that would have yielded
the position on privateering for a broader protection of private property.
If only there had not been a change of administrations in the United
States (Pierce to Buchanan), and if the domestic tensions over slavery had
not diverted all energy from the new Buchanan Administration's foreign
policy, the United States might have been able to negotiate a liberal
amendment to the Declaration of Paris which would have protected
United States interests and advanced international law at the same time.
The somewhat disingenuous efforts of Secretary Seward in the spring of
1861 to bring to bear the weight of the international community against
Confederate privateering proved unsuccessful in the face of the neutrality
adopted by Britain and France, among others.
In short, this episode-this historical footnote-reflects Professor
Murphy's position that nations do not deviate from the international rule
of law when they decline to enter into a treaty obligation in the face of
contrary and compelling national interests.
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